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THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE TO MARRY
RUTH COLKER*
Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only 
to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and 
assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.
—Obergefell v. Hodges1




Over the last several decades, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans (LGBT)3 
community made the political decision to push for “marriage equality” and the “freedom to 
marry,” rather than “same-sex” marriage or “homosexual” marriage.4 Like the decision that 
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assistance in finding many of the resources cited in this Article. I would also like to thank Erin Archerd, Carla 
Corroto, David Levine, Melissa Murray, and Suja Thomas for comments on an earlier draft.
1  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
2  Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 Wm. & mary J. 
Women & L. 339, 363 (2014). 
3  Although I use the terminology “LGBT,” I recognize that the equality rights of trans or bisexual 
individuals have received comparatively less attention by the LGBT community than the rights of gay men and 
lesbians. Elsewhere, I have discussed the problem of bisexual invisibility. See Ruth Colker, Hybrid Revisited, 
100 Geo. L.J. 1069 (2012). The limited implications of the marriage equality movement to bisexual and trans 
individuals are beyond the scope of this paper, but I use the phrase “LGBT” because that is the term that the 
gay rights community typically uses for itself at this time.
4  Although it is difficult to document this transition, the language of one leading writer in the field is 
instructive in seeing the transition to the use of the term “marriage equality.” In 1993, Professor William 
Eskridge published an article entitled “A History of Same-Sex Marriage.” See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A 
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. reV. 1419 (1993). In 2015, he published a blog entry in which 
he talked about “marriage equality.” See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Original Meaning, Public 
Deliberation, and Marriage Equality, SCoTUSbLoG (Jan. 17, 2015, 11:52 AM),  http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2015/01/symposium-original-meaning-public-deliberation-and-marriage-equality-2/ [http://perma.cc/VP4S-
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made in the 1970s, to refer to “gender-based” equality rather 
than “sex-based” equality, this change in terminology tried to focus society on the concept 
of “equality” rather than “sex”5 and the category of “marriage” rather than “homosexual 
Z3XF].
One of the only discussions of the appropriate terminology in a judicial decision appeared in a Hawaii 
decision and was repeated by one of the Justices in a Massachusetts decision. Massachusetts Chief Justice 
Marshall explained:
We use the terms ‘‘same sex’’ and ‘‘opposite sex’’ when characterizing the couples 
in question, because these terms are more accurate in this context than the terms 
‘‘homosexual’’ or ‘‘heterosexual,’’ although at times we use those terms when we consider 
them appropriate. Nothing in our marriage law precludes people who identify themselves 
(or who are identified by others) as gay, lesbian, or bisexual from marrying persons of the 
opposite sex. 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 n.11 (Mass. 2003) (citation omitted). 
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court already understood the importance of emphasizing the concept of 
“equality” rather than the concept of “sex.” It said:
“Homosexual” and “same-sex” marriages are not synonymous; by the same token, a 
“heterosexual” same-sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic. A “homosexual” person 
is defined as “[o]ne sexually attracted to another of the same sex.” 16 Taber’S CyCLopediC 
med. diCTionary 839 (1989). “Homosexuality” is “sexual desire or behavior directed 
toward a person or persons of one’s own sex.” WebSTer’S enCyCLopediC UnabridGed 
diCTionary of The enGLiSh LanGUaGe 680 (1989). Conversely, “heterosexuality” is  
“[s]exual attraction for one of the opposite sex,” Taber’S CyCLopediC med. diCTionary 
at 827, or “sexual feeling or behavior directed toward a person or persons of the opposite 
sex.” WebSTer’S enCyCLopediC UnabridGed diCTionary of The enG. LanGUaGe at 667. 
Parties to “a union between a man and a woman” may or may not be homosexuals. Parties 
to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 1993) (as clarified on reconsideration) (May 27, 1993).
5  See Catherine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender Justice: Supreme Court’s Newest 
Member Speaks at Her Old Law School and Brings Down the House with Her History Lesson About Fighting 
Bias, L.a. TimeS, Nov. 21, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-21/news/mn-59217_1_supreme-court 
[http://perma.cc/X8NN-FN96] (“I owe it all to my secretary at Columbia Law School, who said, ‘I’m typing 
all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex is on every page,’” Ginsburg said. “‘Don’t you 
know that those nine men [on the Supreme Court]—they hear that word, and their first association is not the 
way you want them to be thinking? Why don’t you use the word gender? It is a grammatical term and it will 
ward off distracting associations.’”). 
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marriage.”6 Although this change in terminology cannot, alone, account for changes in 
public opinion, it does coincide with increasing public acceptance of individuals having the 
freedom to marry the person they love without regard to sex or sexual orientation.7 
Thus, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,8 the 
leading LGBT rights organizations applauded a victory for “marriage equality”9 or the 
“freedom to marry.”10 Partially reflecting this change in terminology, the Obergefell Court 
described the victory as one for “same-sex marriage,”11 the “freedom to marry,”12 and the 
“right to marry,”13 although it never mentioned the term “marriage equality.” 
But what is “marriage equality” and the “freedom to marry”? How does Obergefell 
relate to those two constitutional protections? This Article argues that the Obergefell 
6  The Gallup Organization changed the wording of its questions about same-sex marriage while public 
perceptions about the institution were changing. From 1996 to 2005, it asked: “Do you think marriage between 
homosexuals should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same . . . as traditional marriages?” 
In 2006, it changed the wording to “same-sex couples” rather than “homosexuals.” See Gay and Lesbian 
Rights, GaLLUp, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx [http://perma.cc/49M6-AYHT].
7  See Marriage, GaLLUp, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx [http://perma.cc/D9RH-
EMYQ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (percentage of public in a Gallup Poll who said same-sex marriage 
should be valid increased from twenty-seven percent in 1996 to fifty-five percent in 2014; the poll changed the 
language to refer to “same-sex couples” rather than “homosexuals” in 2006).
8  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
9  James Esseks, All Eyes on Justice Kennedy, aCLU: Speak freeLy (May 1, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://www.
aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/all-eyes-justice-kennedy [http://perma.cc/SY27-NE92] (referring to “marriage 
equality”); Love Wins, hUman riGhTS CampaiGn, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/stand-for-marriage [http://
perma.cc/AS52-R7S4] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (referring to “marriage equality”); Sign Our Thank You 
Message, aCLU, https://action.aclu.org/secure/sign-our-thank-you-message?ms=web_150626_scotus_mar 
[http://perma.cc/B6XX-JYHA] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (referring to “marriage equality”).
10  Marriage, Relationships and Family Protection, Lambda LeGaL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/issues/
marriage-relationships-and-family-protections [http://perma.cc/2BKC-VT9T] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) 
(referring to “freedom to marry”).
11  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. The “lower” courts have also vacillated in their use of the term 
“marriage equality” in recent cases involving same-sex marriage. Compare Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 
1198 (10th Cir. 2014) (referring to case as a “marriage equality appeal”), with Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
396 (6th Cir. 2014) (referring to case as about “same-sex marriages”).
12  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
13  See id. at 2593, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2603. The Obergefell court does not distinguish between the “freedom 
to marry” and the “right to marry.”
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decision reflects an important advance for some aspects of marriage equality and the 
freedom to marry,14 while also insufficiently developing the freedom to choose to marry. 
Nonetheless, the roots of the freedom to choose to marry can be found in the precedent 
underlying Obergefell as well as in some aspects of the decision itself. 
“Marriage equality” should be understood to have three interrelated aspects.15 First, 
the two members of the couple16 should be entitled to have a relationship of equality rather 
than one of domination and submission.17 As Justice Ginsburg mentioned during the oral 
argument in Obergefell, the elimination of laws like Louisiana’s “Head and Master” rule18 
helped to change marriage so that it would no longer be a state-mandated “relationship 
of a dominant male to a subordinate female.”19 Second, marital and nonmarital couples 
14  This Article uses the terms “freedom” and “right” interchangeably because the Court has used those 
terms interchangeably in its marriage decisions. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2603. As 
Professor John Garvey has argued, “freedom of choice is at the heart of the right to marry.” John H. Garvey, 
Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 harV. L. reV. 1756, 1761 (1981). While there may be some 
important differences between a “freedom” and a “right,” those differences are beyond the scope of this Article. 
15  For example, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court extended formal equality on the basis 
of race by banning the exclusion of people from marriage based on their race while also recognizing that 
one factor that made the challenged Virginia statute invidious was that it furthered white supremacy by only 
seeking to maintain the “racial integrity” of the white race. Id. at 12 n.11. The Loving opinion also rested on the 
“freedom to marry.” See id. at 12.
16  The status of multiple-person relationships is beyond the scope of this Article.
17  For development of dominance/submission theory, see CaTharine a. maCkinnon, ToWard a feminiST 
Theory of The STaTe (1989).
18  See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
19  Justice Ginsburg referred to this aspect of marriage equality during oral argument in Obergefell: 
But you wouldn’t be asking for this relief if the law of marriage was what it was a 
millennium ago. I mean, it wasn’t possible. Same-sex unions would not have opted into the 
pattern of marriage, which was a relationship, a dominant and a subordinate relationship. 
Yes, it was marriage between a man and a woman, but the man decided where the couple 
would be domiciled; it was her obligation to follow him.
There was a change in the institution of marriage to make it egalitarian when it wasn’t 
egalitarian. And same-sex unions wouldn’t—wouldn’t fit into what marriage was once.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). Later, during 
the oral argument, Justice Ginsburg repeated that point, observing that the Court struck down Louisiana’s 
“Head and Master Rule” in 1982, heralding the development of a more egalitarian marriage regime. She said:
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should be treated with equal dignity and respect so that access to important societal benefits 
and privileges, such as adoption or contraception, are not dependent on a couple’s marital 
status.20 Third, individuals should be able to enter into marriage on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s historic decision to overturn anti-miscegenation 
statutes.21 The courts have also referred to this third aspect of marriage equality as the 
“freedom to marry”22 or the “right to marry,”23 emphasizing that characteristics like the 
race of one’s partner should not serve to exclude one from the institution. While the 
Obergefell decision undoubtedly furthers the third aspect of marriage equality, by allowing 
couples to enter the institution without regard to their sex or sexual orientation, 24 it does 
not sufficiently recognize and protect the first two aspects of marriage equality. Without 
all three aspects of marriage equality, this Article argues that individuals will not have the 
freedom to choose to marry.
By tracing the development of the freedom to marry (or what the Obergefell Court 
interchangeably describes as the “right to marry”25), Part I of this Article argues that 
the freedom to marry should be understood to include the freedom to choose not to get 
Marriage today is not what it was under the common law tradition, under the civil law 
tradition. Marriage was a relationship of a dominant male to a subordinate female.
That ended as a result of this Court’s decision in 1982 when Louisiana’s Head and Master 
Rule was struck down. And no State was allowed to have such a—such a marriage anymore.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 70–71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). Justice 
Ginsburg made a slight factual error when she said the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana’s Head and 
Master Rule in 1982. The year was actually 1981. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
20  See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that Massachusetts statute permitting 
married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy but prohibiting unmarried persons to obtain 
such contraceptives violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
21  See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that preventing marriages solely on the 
basis of one’s racial classification violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).
22  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”).
23  Id. (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”) (emphasis added). 
24  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
25  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2603.
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married,26 just as the freedom to choose to use contraceptives27 or have an abortion28 also 
includes the freedom to choose not to get sterilized,29 not to have a compulsory caesarean 
section,30 as well as to go to term with one’s pregnancy.31 
Part II relates the first aspect of marriage equality—the elimination of the subordinate 
treatment of women within marriage—to the Obergefell decision. Despite the elimination 
of coverture, this Article argues that marriages between a man and a woman32 often 
continue to retain the traditional elements of a relationship between “a dominant male” and 
“subordinate female.”33 The Obergefell Court’s idealistic assertion that marriage offers the 
“hope of companionship and understanding”34 ignores the evidence that women, within 
marriage, are disproportionately the individuals who provide care to others while also 
disproportionately facing the threat of violence in their intimate lives.35 This Article argues 
that the Obergefell decision is neither the result of, nor likely to lead to, improvement in 
the first aspect of marriage equality unless the Court recognizes the importance of women 
having a more genuine choice whether to enter (or leave) this institution.36 
26  See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (referring to the “freedom to marry, or not marry”).
27  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (describing “a right . . . to choose to terminate [a 
woman’s] pregnancy”) (emphasis added).
29  See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (overturning Oklahoma’s Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act of 1935); In re Estate of K.E.J., 887 N.E.2d 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (providing that 
a guardian must establish by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in the ward’s best interest when 
ward is not competent to make the decision herself).
30  See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (right of patient to make decision about caesarean section).
31  See Farah Diaz-Tello & Lynn Paltrow, Birth Justice as Reproductive Justice (Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant 
Women, Working Paper, May 2012), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/Birth%20justice%202012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R87S-C2WJ] (arguing for women to have control over the conditions of their childbirth).
32  Throughout this Article, I have not referred to individuals by virtue of their sexual orientation because I 
recognize that some individuals identify as bisexuals. We therefore do not know someone’s sexual orientation 
merely by knowing the sex of the person with whom the individual is intimate. 
33  Transcript of Oral Argument at 70 –71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556) 
(Justice Ginsburg referring to historical changes within marriage). For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.
34  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
35  See infra Part II.B.
36  The Obergefell Court recognized the lack of transformative effect of its opinion on traditional marriage 
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Part III relates the second aspect of marriage equality—the equal treatment of marital 
and nonmarital relationships—to the Obergefell decision. The Obergefell Court’s emphasis 
on the importance of children being raised by married parents reflects the historical stigma 
against nonmarital parents and their children. The Court’s decision might contribute to 
that stigma by facilitating states’ refusals to allow unmarried couples to adopt children.37 
Further, the Court’s emphasis on the financial benefits that are accorded marital couples, in 
contrast to those offered nonmarital couples, reflects the historical discrimination against 
nonmarital couples. The Court’s opinion might facilitate the deepening of that disparity by 
emboldening entities to eliminate the few benefits they currently offer nonmarital couples.38 
In order to further the second aspect of marriage equality, the Court needs to question 
why certain rights and privileges, such as adoption and financial benefits, are limited to 
nonmarital couples, and avoid a simplistically idealistic portrayal of marriage under which 
government is allowed to reflexively limit those benefits to marital couples.
Part IV concludes by suggesting that we could better attain genuine marriage equality 
by insisting that the freedom to choose to marry requires the state to develop a more neutral 
legal stance towards the institution of marriage. Such a stance might improve the institution 
of marriage itself, by encouraging people to enter it for love and companionship rather 
than instrumental benefits, while also respecting the freedom of individuals to share love 
and companionship without entering the institution of marriage. By exploring sociological 
evidence from one country that has developed a more neutral stance towards marriage, this 
Article suggests that such an approach is both attainable and beneficial. The freedom to 
choose to marry is a possibility under conditions of genuine marriage equality.
I. From the Freedom to Marry to the Freedom to Choose to Marry 
How do we can truly achieve genuine marriage equality and the freedom to choose to 
marry? One step forward is to build on the Obergefell Court’s observation that the freedom 
to marry is both an equality interest and a liberty interest—one that we can genuinely 
choose whether to accept. Close examination of some of the liberty and equality case law 
underlying the Obergefell opinion can provide us with the foundation to build a genuine 
freedom to choose to marry.
when it noted that same-sex couples planned to “honor” their relationships rather than “denigrate” (or transform) 
the institution of marriage. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.
37  See infra Part III.A.
38  See infra Part III.B.
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A. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters: The Freedom to Choose Education
The foundational, liberty case law is based on a freedom to choose to engage in various 
protected activities, as reflected in the 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,39 
which was discussed in the Obergefell opinion.40 Oregon’s 1922 state initiative to amend the 
state’s Compulsory Education Act required parents to send their children to a public school, 
thereby precluding them from attending plaintiff’s parochial school.41 The plaintiffs argued 
that the statute “conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children 
will receive appropriate mental and religious training.”42 The Supreme Court accepted this 
argument, finding that the “fundamental theory of liberty” prevents the “general power 
of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only.”43 The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against enforcement of the 
statute that had been entered by the lower courts.44 As a result of this injunction, no one 
would be forced to send his or her child to a nonpublic school but the option of such 
education was retained by the Court’s liberty-based decision. Thus, properly understood, 
Pierce protected the freedom of parents to choose a private or public school for their 
children’s education. 
B. Griswold v. Connecticut: The Freedom to Choose Contraceptives
In overturning a state statute that precluded married couples from using contraceptives, 
the Supreme Court built on the Pierce decision in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut.45 The 
Griswold Court described Pierce as standing for the proposition that “the right to educate 
one’s children as one chooses is made applicable to the State by the force of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”46 It found that Connecticut law interfered with the “zone 
39  Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
40  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
41  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
42  Id. at 532.
43  Id. at 535.
44  Id. at 536.
45  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 481, 481 (1965). 
46  Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
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of privacy” and had “a maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship.”47 
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain how the law achieved this “maximum destructive 
impact” but one might surmise that the Court believed the law impinged on a married 
couple’s decisions whether or not to seek to have children and whether or not to engage in 
nonprocreative sexual intercourse. The Court’s decision protected the right to choose not to 
procreate as well as the right to retain the ability to procreate.48 The Obergefell Court cited 
Griswold for the proposition that the Constitution protects “certain personal choices central 
to individual dignity and autonomy,”49 recognizing the foundational element of “choice” 
in that decision.
C. Loving v. Virginia: The Freedom to Choose to Marry
Then, in 1967, the landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia50 invalidated anti-
miscegenation laws and recognized the “freedom of choice to marry.” This case received 
considerable attention from the Obergefell Court as the basis of the freedom to marry.51
The story underlying this case reflects the limited choices available to a mixed-race 
couple. Mildred and Richard Loving were married in Washington, D.C. on June 2, 1958, 
but their families were from Central Point, Virginia.52 After getting married in D.C., they 
returned to Virginia to live with Mildred’s parents where, five weeks later, they were 
arrested by the county sheriff and two deputies for violating Virginia’s Racial Purity Law.53 
They got married in D.C. because Richard, who was white, realized that Virginia law would 
47  Id. at 485.
48  The right to be free from involuntary sterilization has been protected since the Court’s 1942 decision in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Cf. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 629 (1987) (“Surely no one 
could contend, for instance that a concern for limiting welfare outlays could justify mandatory sterilization of 
AFDC beneficiaries.”). See also supra notes 29–31.
49  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). See also id. at 2598, 2599 (citing Griswold, 381 
U.S. 481).
50  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
51  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2599, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2614, 2619.
52  See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of Loving 
v. Virginia, 41 hoW. L.J. 229, 234 (1998); Douglas Martin, Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race 
Marriage, Dies at 68, n.y. TimeS, May 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/us/06loving.html [http://
perma.cc/X7VP-W8HF]. 
53  See Pratt, supra note 52, at 236.
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not allow the couple to marry in Virginia due to the fact that Mildred was part-Cherokee 
and part-black.54 Virginia law also precluded them from residing in Virginia after they 
married. The state law “stipulated that all marriages between a white person and a colored 
person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process, and 
it prohibited interracial couples from circumventing the law by having their marriages 
validated elsewhere and later return to Virginia.”55 The penalty, as they soon learned, when 
they were arrested by three law enforcement officers early one morning in Virginia,56 was 
a year in jail if they ever returned to Virginia. They only avoided that penalty by agreeing 
to move to Washington, D.C., pay a court fine, and not “return together or at the same time 
for a period of twenty-five years.”57 
In convicting them of violating the state Racial Purity statute, the state court judge 
made clear his animosity to their relationship and marriage: “Almighty God created the 
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And 
but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. 
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”58 
When the Lovings sought to have the judge vacate their conviction in 1963 so they could 
return to Virginia, he refused.59 That refusal was the legal basis of their Supreme Court 
case.
Their case parallels Obergefell 60 in that Virginia’s marriage law precluded recognition 
of mixed-race marriages irrespective of whether the couple married out of state and returned 
to Virginia, or sought to get married in Virginia. While the modern bans against same-sex 
marriages did not create criminal penalties for same-sex couples who sought to marry, they 
achieved the parallel result of failing to recognize the validity of marriages even if they had 
been performed out of state. 
54  See id. at 230, 236.
55  Id. at 236.
56  Id. 
57  Id.
58  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
59  Id.
60  “The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to 
marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.” Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
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Loving also has parallels to the decision overturning state sodomy statutes in Lawrence 
v. Texas.61 The plaintiffs in Lawrence faced criminal penalties for engaging in sexual 
activity. The plaintiffs in Loving faced criminal penalties for getting married. 
But the parallel between Loving and Lawrence also breaks down when one considers 
the tapestry of laws criminalizing sexual activity between mixed-race couples. Whereas 
sodomy laws typically targeted all sexual activities between two people of the same sex,62 
laws criminalizing mixed-race sexual activity were often more selective. Referring to the 
lawfulness of white men having sex with black female slaves, one commentator noted: 
“After all, it was cheaper to breed slaves than to import them.”63 The criminal law statutes 
prohibiting fornication and adultery were typically only enforced to prevent mixed-race 
sexual activity when the woman was white.64 “[S]exual exploitation of black women was 
maintained and promoted by the system of segregation, including prohibitions against 
interracial marriage.”65 A white man could have free rein over a black woman’s sexuality 
but not be expected to marry her. In fact, the anti-miscegenation laws precluded him from 
marrying her. 
Thus, in context, what did the Loving Court mean when it referred to the “freedom to 
choose to marry”? The Loving Court says: “The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the 
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with 
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”66 The Court is referring to the choice 
of the race of one’s partner rather than the choice of whether to get married. The state of 
Virginia had not sought to prevent a white man from having sexual relations with a black 
woman, but it did not want him to marry her. 
Hence, Loving contains the “freedom to choose” formulation proposed by this Article 
but does not do so in a context that emphasizes that two people might choose not to marry 
61  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
62  See generally Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 harV. L. reV. 1508, 1519 
(1989) (surveying sodomy statutes).
63  Pratt, supra note 52, at 232.
64  Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race and Same-Gender 
Marriage, 37 harV. C.r.-C.L. reV. 255, 257–58 (2002).
65  Id. at 260.
66  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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but still want the full respect and recognition offered to marital relationships. In the race 
context, that would have been an odd formulation because one might argue that black 
women could only hope for societal respect if their white partner was willing to marry 
them. An unmarried relationship between a black woman and white man was nothing new 
or remarkable; it was the expected relationship. It would have been no victory for the 
racial civil rights movement for the Loving Court to emphasize the freedom of a white man 
not to marry a black, female, sexual partner. The choice that was absent was only in one 
direction—the desire of a white man and black woman to marry each other. 
Loving, therefore, plants the seeds of “choice” in thinking about marriage but does not 
contemplate that choice as including the freedom not to marry. Further development of 
the concept of liberty is needed for the Court to also develop the freedom to refrain from a 
decision to marry.67
D. Roe v. Wade: The Freedom to Choose to Terminate a Pregnancy
The grounding of the Court’s liberty decisions in the freedom to choose is clearer in 
Roe v. Wade.68 By making abortion illegal, the plaintiff argued that the state of Texas had 
“improperly invade[d] a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to 
terminate her pregnancy.”69 The Supreme Court largely accepted that argument, finding that 
the right of privacy, as based on the concept of liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”70 While the Court would certainly recognize the desire of many women to 
choose to give birth, it also recognized “the distress, for all concerned, associated with the 
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.”71 Thus, the Court’s decision is understood to 
protect the freedom to choose to terminate one’s pregnancy.
A discussion of Roe v. Wade is absent from the Court’s decision in Obergefell, probably 
67  See generally Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 yaLe L.J. 624, 638 (1980) 
(developing the freedom of “nonassociation”).
68  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69  Id. at 129.
70  Id. at 153.
71  Id.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 39530.2
because of the controversial nature of that opinion.72 Nonetheless, that case is clearly an 
important component of the development of the Court’s liberty doctrine, particularly with 
respect to the concept of “choice.” 
 
E. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Freedom to Choose to Terminate a 
Pregnancy
About a decade before the Court extended some liberty rights to gay men and lesbians, 
the Court reaffirmed that the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
included the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.73 In reaffirming this liberty interest, the plurality opinion, which 
was joined by Justice Kennedy (the author of Obergefell) was careful to recognize the 
reasonable bases upon which people might make different choices regarding the abortion 
decision:
One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation that 
any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no matter 
how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being. 
Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant 
is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent.74
In recognizing a woman’s freedom to choose to terminate her pregnancy, the Court, 
however, did not insist that the state take a position of complete neutrality with respect to 
the woman’s decision. “Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue 
her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from 
taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed.”75 The Court selected 
the amorphous “undue burden”76 standard to determine if a state regulation interfered with 
the woman’s constitutional freedom to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy 
72  While not discussing Roe as a basis for its interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent cites Justice 
Ginsburg’s article on Roe to support its argument that “heavy-handed judicial intervention” is inappropriate. 
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 n.C. L. reV. 375, 385–86 (1985)).
73  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing the “right of the woman 
to choose to have an abortion before viability”).
74  Id. at 853.
75  Id. at 872.
76  Id. at 876.
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before viability. Thus, Casey protected a woman’s freedom to choose whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy while also allowing a state, if it desired, to enact regulations that 
would impose some restrictions on a woman’s ability to procure an abortion. Whether 
those restrictions were “undue” was determined by assessing whether the “state regulation 
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”77 In Casey, the Court upheld certain restrictions and 
overturned others, based on the application of the undue burden standard, making it clear 
that the state did not have to take a perfectly neutral stance with respect to the woman’s 
abortion decision. Because the Court recognized the right of the state to impose some 
restrictions on the abortion decision, it would be wrong to describe the Court’s opinion as 
“pro-abortion.” Instead, it was “pro-choice.” 
As the Court turned to the application of this line of cases to the rights of gay men and 
lesbians to engage in sexual intimacy, and, ultimately, to choose to get married, the Court 
never repeated this “undue burden” legal standard (or even cited Casey). It therefore leaves 
open the question whether the undue burden standard is unique to the abortion arena. In 
other areas in which the Court has found a “liberty” interest, is the state allowed to try 
to interfere with the individual’s exercise of that liberty interest by expressing a policy 
preference for the individual choosing, or not choosing, to exercise that liberty interest? Is 
abortion different because of the state’s recognized interest in protecting potential life? As 
discussed below, in Parts I (F)–(H), the answer to that question should be “yes,” because 
the freedom to choose to express sexual intimacy and the freedom to choose to marry pose 
few strong countervailing state interests that justify the state tipping its hand in a particular 
direction.
F. Lawrence v. Texas: The Freedom to Choose Sexual Intimacy
After hinting in 1996 in Romer v. Evans that the Court was prepared to broadly protect 
gay men and lesbians from state regulations that seem “inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class it affects,”78 the Court in Lawrence v. Texas,79 in an opinion authored 
by Justice Kennedy, overturned a Texas sodomy statute that was only enforced against 
same-sex participants. As it has in many of its gay rights decisions, the Court connected 
equal protection and liberty principles: “Equality of treatment and the due process right 
to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked 
77  Id. at 877.
78  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
79  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”80 The 
Lawrence decision was an important basis of the Court’s decision in Obergefell.81
Unlike the Casey decision, Lawrence fails to identify the legal rule that governs its 
decision. May the state limit individuals’ liberty interests in private sexual intimacy in 
any way? What kinds of arguments, if any, can be used to limit the freedom of couples to 
engage in sexual intimacy? 
There are two passages in Lawrence that hint at the answer to that question but do not 
resolve it. First, the Court tells us what the case does not involve, suggesting that a state 
might regulate an individual’s liberty interest in sexual intimacy if one of these factors 
were involved:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who 
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.82
One could interpret that passage to mean that a state might restrict (or even ban) 
sexual relations with minors, nonconsensual sexual relations, public sexual expression, 
prostitution, or legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Yet, the Lawrence decision 
does not make clear how significantly that restriction might be imposed. Can a state, for 
example, criminalize all sexual conduct involving individuals under the age of eighteen? 
Without a legal framework, it is impossible to resolve that question. But the post-Lawrence 
case law also makes it clear that the Court did not mean that states might restrict or ban 
everything on that list. We now know that a state must recognize marriage between two 
individuals of the same sex. With hindsight, therefore, that passage tells us very little about 
the Court’s framework. It may simply tell us what the case is not about—leaving to another 
day the resolution of cases fitting those fact patterns. 
Second, the Court tells us what rights the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke. “Their right 
to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
80  Id. at 575.
81  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2602, 2604, 2606 (2015).
82  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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without intervention of the government.”83 Citing Casey, the Court then says: “It is a promise 
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.”84 Presumably, so long as they have consent and have not engaged in coercion or 
injury, adults get to decide on the parameters of their sexual intimacy. Building on the 
abortion case law, individuals have the freedom to choose with whom and how to engage 
in sexual intimacy. It is unthinkable that the state would insist that two people engage in 
intimate sexual behavior, just as it is impermissible for a state to criminalize “two adults 
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to 
a homosexual lifestyle.”85 One might say that Lawrence protects the freedom to choose to 
be celibate as fully as it protects the freedom to choose to be sexually intimate.
G. United States v. Windsor: The Right to the Exclusive Benefits of Marriage
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Windsor,86 which 
invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), was a huge victory for 
the third aspect of marriage equality. It made it possible for married, same-sex couples 
to access the full set of benefits accorded to marital couples by the federal government. 
Windsor is cited extensively in Obergefell.87 Nonetheless, the Windsor Court’s reflexive 
assumption that the state should be able to limit valuable tax benefits to marital couples 
fails to sufficiently further the freedom to choose to get married. Although Edith Windsor 
and Thea Spyer held a commitment ceremony decades ago, during which they exchanged 
a circular diamond brooch and made a long-term commitment to each other, Windsor’s 
constitutional entitlement to the tax benefits of a long-term relationship was contingent on 
their legally-recognized marital status.88 The Court held that she was entitled to obtain a tax 
refund for the $363,053 she had paid in federal estate taxes, because she and Spyer were 
legally married in Canada in 2007, not because they had a commitment ceremony many 
decades earlier. 89 
83  Id. 
84  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
85  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
86  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
87  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599–2601 (2015).
88  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. See Roberta Kaplan, “It’s All About Edie, Stupid”: Lessons from Litigating 
United States v. Windsor, 29 CoLUm. J. Gender & L. 85, 88 (2015).
89  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
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While furthering the third aspect of marriage equality, the Windsor decision undermined 
the second aspect of marriage equality—the equal treatment of marital and nonmarital 
couples. Spyer and Windsor were fortunate to have the resources to travel to Canada to get 
married, at a time when New York was not granting same-sex marriages. After New York 
recognized their marriage, Windsor was also able to attain the services of a lawyer to ask 
for a refund of the estate taxes she had paid to the federal government. But for the trip to 
Canada, she would not have been allowed to ask that her relationship be treated with the 
“dignity”90 of heterosexual marriages. In other words, no one asked why a relationship is 
only entitled to a $363,053 tax benefit if the two members of that relationship are married. 
States and the federal government are unquestionably allowed to “give this class of persons 
. . . a dignity and status of immense import.”91 But should these benefits be limited to those 
who are legally married? Because Spyer and Windsor were legally married, this issue did 
not directly arise in Windsor.
Under the third aspect of marriage equality, the Court’s decision in Windsor is correct. 
If opposite-sex couples are allowed to get married and receive a massive tax benefit, then 
same-sex couples should have the same opportunity. But if the freedom to marry is truly 
a liberty interest, grounded in the freedom to choose, then similarly situated, unmarried 
partners should also be able to request such a tax benefit—or adopt and raise a child with 
the same ease as married partners—under the second aspect of marriage equality. By 
limiting that benefit to those who are married, the state is placing a heavy hand on the 
scale in favor of marriage. It is being far from neutral. Recognition of the second aspect 
of marriage equality would, at least, give litigants who represent unmarried couples the 
opportunity to ask the state to justify this stark difference in treatment between marital and 
nonmarital couples.
A response to this observation is that the abortion case law allows the state to take a 
non-neutral stance towards abortion. The state is allowed to regulate abortion to further 
interests such as the protection of fetal life so long as its regulation does not pose an undue 
burden on the woman seeking an abortion. The Court’s case law on what constitutes an 
undue burden is murky but, at least, we have a legal standard. And, in the abortion area, we 
have a clearly articulated state interest—the protection of potential life. 
In the marriage context, however, there has been no clear articulation of why the state 
needs to take a pro-marriage stance. One might argue that married people have higher 
90  Id. at 2692.
91  Id.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law400 30.2
rates of happiness, but that happiness could be, in part, due to the benefits that society 
accords to those who are married. One might argue that it is better for children to be 
“legitimated” by having married parents but that argument merely allows one form of 
prejudice (illegitimacy) to support another form of prejudice (unmarried status). One 
might argue that married couples tend to have longer and more stable relationships than 
unmarried couples. Even if that is true (and those married relationships are healthy ones 
that should be maintained), that does not answer the question of why the government needs 
to financially support those relationships. People could still have religious marriages or 
private nonreligious commitment ceremonies, even if the state did not recognize marriage. 
Those ceremonies might “cement” relationships in a way that would be supportive of their 
long-term nature. 
Equally importantly, we should remember that not all relationships that may be 
recognized through state-sanctioned marriage should endure. Marriage does not shield 
women from abuse and violence.92 Marriage may also make it harder for women to leave 
abusive relationships. As will be discussed in Part II, women tend to sacrifice some of their 
wage-earning power during marriage, especially if they have children.93 Their financial 
precariousness can make it difficult for them to leave abusive relationships, let alone ones 
that are merely unpleasant. It was not until fairly recent times that a woman could allege 
that she was raped while married.94 “Marital rape” was considered an oxymoron. Although 
we have removed the legal barrier from claiming marital rape or seeking divorce, we have 
not removed all the social barriers. By allowing the state to financially privilege marriage, 
we may make it harder for women and men to “choose” to leave their marriage or not enter 
it in the first place. 
The determination that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional was grounded in “the 
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause [which] contains within it 
the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”95 DOMA 
was found to be unconstitutional because it has the “purpose and effect to disparage and 
92  See raqUeL kennedy berGen WiTh eLizabeTh barnhiLL, naT’L reS. CTr. on VioLenCe aGainST Women, 
mariTaL rape: neW reSearCh and direCTionS (2011), http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-
document.php?doc_id=248 (marital rape) [http://perma.cc/5A9E-VZ8V].
93  See Conner, supra note 2, at 341. 
94  As recently as 1962, the Model Penal Code precluded the possibility of marital rape. See Deborah W. 
Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should be Pulled and Replaced, 1 ohio ST. J. 
Crim. L. 207, 213–14 (2003).
95  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
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to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood 
and dignity.”96 The federal government could offer “no legitimate purpose” to justify that 
injury.97 The Court, however, did not consider whether Edith Windsor would have had a 
comparable injury had she and Spyer not traveled to Canada to have their relationship 
legally recognized. Their private ceremony in front of their friends, with an exchange of 
jewelry, would have still rendered their relationship invisible in the eyes of the state. The 
Court does not ask what “legitimate purpose” is served by treating couples so differently 
depending on whether they register their ceremony with the state as a marriage. To develop 
the freedom of choice to marry, that question should be raised in future cases.
H. Obergefell v. Hodges: Towards the Freedom to Choose to Marry 
While most legal observers predicted that the Windsor decision would lead to the 
invalidation of all state bans on same-sex marriage, the Obergefell Court still had the 
responsibility to explain its rationale for that conclusion. A close examination of the 
justification offered by the Obergefell Court for that extension shows how a freedom to 
choose to marry can be found in that justification even if the freedom to choose is not 
emphasized by the Court’s decision.
The Obergefell Court mentions four principles that support extending state-recognized 
marriage to same-sex couples. This Part suggests how the Court’s four principles could be 
refined and developed to support the freedom to choose to marry.
1. “The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in 
the concept of individual autonomy.”98 
The Court’s articulation of this principle explicitly emphasizes the concept of “choice” 
yet the Court does not seem to understand what “choice” would truly mean in the marital 
context. It does not distinguish between a person deciding to get married in a private or 
religious setting and the state deciding to accord benefits to those who choose to marry.99 
 
96  Id. at 2696.
97  Id.
98  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
99  For discussions of the history of marriage and its transformation into a legally-recognized institution, see 
STephanie CoonTz, marriaGe: a hiSTory: from obedienCe To inTimaCy, or hoW LoVe ConqUered marriaGe 
(2005) (recognizing that the state had no role in the recognition of marriage for at least sixteen centuries).
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This sloppiness or confusion does not exist in other areas where the Court recognizes 
liberty interests. For example, the Court readily distinguishes between a woman having the 
freedom to choose to have an abortion and the state being required to pay for that abortion 
under Medicaid.100 
When the Court refers to the “personal choice regarding marriage,” it seems to be 
referring to the personal choice to enter a state-sanctioned institution of marriage. In 
the second half of the sentence articulating this first principle, the Court connects this 
“right to personal choice” to “individual autonomy.” Because the “personal choice 
regarding marriage” is the personal choice to enter state-sanctioned marriage, the Court 
is directly connecting state recognition of marriage to individual autonomy. An emphasis 
on individual autonomy, in fact, could lead to a very different conclusion. “Autonomy” 
evokes a libertarian perspective—that one should make a decision alone without state 
interference. The concept of individual autonomy, as applied to marriage, could mean that 
the state should take an entirely neutral stance with respect to marriage—neither forbidding 
people from privately entering this institution nor according any legal benefits to those who 
do. It seems incongruous to say that the concept of individual autonomy requires the state 
to recognize the marital relationship. 
The Court’s discussion of this principle emphasizes the concept of “choice”101 without 
investigating what it means to have a genuine “choice.” The Court says:
“Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, 
and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions 
concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual  
can make.”102
“Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”103
100 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (states that participate in Medicaid are not required to provide 
state-funded abortions).
101 The Court also uses the terminology of “choice” elsewhere in its opinion. “In addition these liberties 
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
102 Id. at 2599.
103 Id.
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“There is a dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek 
to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”104
In this last passage, in particular, the Court thinks of “choice” as only moving in 
one direction—to make the decision to marry. Its view is colored by the expectation that 
marriage constitutes the highest form of personal expression. “The nature of marriage is 
that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as 
expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual 
orientation.”105 In that passage, the Court says “can” rather than “shall” but, nonetheless, 
seems to favor marriage over other kinds of personal relationships. 
Even though the Court may favor marriage over other forms of relationships, it ties the 
benefits of marriage to “expression, intimacy, and spirituality” rather than to state-rendered 
benefits such as tax exemptions and the like. Thus, one could read the Court as saying that 
couples must be allowed to enter this state-recognized institution if they feel it will further 
their expression, intimacy, or spirituality. But, of course, entering the institution for those 
highly personal reasons does not require the state to recognize the institution legally. Those 
observations could lead one to conclude that the state should not be allowed to ban private 
expressions of commitment through marriage but does not necessarily mean the state needs 
to privilege marital relationships over other kinds of relationships.
2. “The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a 
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the 
committed individuals.”106
As with the first principle, the Court talks about the “right to marry” without considering 
why the state is allowed to privilege those who choose to marry. Drawing on its decision 
in Lawrence, the Court talks about the importance of individuals being able to enter into 
intimate conduct with another person as “one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.”107 The Court then takes the step to say that couples do not gain freedom by 




107 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
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such couples, if not allowed to marry, would still be “outcast(s).”108 “Outlaw to outcast may 
be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”109
The problem with this line of argument is that it is circular. The “support” is “unlike 
any other,” in part, because the state chooses to offer substantial support to those who enter 
state-sanctioned marriage. The circularity of this argument is not apparent from the Court’s 
opinion, because the Court does not reference state-sanctioned support in this part of its 
opinion. Instead, the Court speaks about the personal benefits that an individual might 
attain by being in a long-term, committed relationship. Without citation, the Court says: 
“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no 
one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while 
both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”110 In those two sentences, one 
could substitute “long-term relationship” for “marriage” and draw the same conclusion. 
The larger difficulty implicit in the Court’s discussion is that many people in society 
consider same-sex partners to be “outcasts” irrespective of whether those relationships 
are recognized by the state as marriages. Harkening back to Plessy v. Ferguson,111 one 
could observe that the state’s failure to recognize those relationships as marriages had a 
reinforcing effect on the thoughts or minds of the public. Before Obergefell, one could argue 
that we had state-sanctioned segregation—same-sex couples had to sit in the segregated 
railroad car of domestic partnership reinforcing prejudices against their relationships. 
Thus, Obergefell is the Brown v. Board of Education112 of the LGBT community because it 
refused to allow the state to maintain this mandated segregation. 
But, on close examination, the analogy falters. The concept of “marriage equality” is 
premised on the notion that one should be able to choose whether to get married. Similarly, 
in the education context, we say that parents may choose the education that their child 
receives, so long as parents make choices that are consistent with the child’s constitutional 




111  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state-sanctioned segregation).
112  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113  The right to choose an education is different than the right to marry because a parent cannot choose 
not to have their child receive an education since all states have compulsory education laws. See Michael 
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children are no longer considered “outcasts.”114 Parents who make such choices are thought 
to be exercising their freedom to choose their children’s education. In fact, the freedom 
of parents to choose their children’s education is part of the liberty case law that supports 
Obergefell.115 
Nonetheless, the Court is probably correct that those who choose to live in nonmarital 
relationships—be they opposite-sex or same-sex relationships—are likely stigmatized by 
society and treated adversely. In the Court’s words, they have not received the “dignity”116 
accorded to others who enter marriage. The Court’s solution to this lack of dignity problem 
is to allow same-sex couples to enter marriage rather than to ask what is the source of the 
“outcast” nature of nonmarital couples. The Court only refers to same-sex couples facing 
that outcast status but, surely, unmarried opposite-sex couples can also face such outcast 
status. That is why we have expressions like “living in sin.” Based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence, Virginia’s statute banning fornication was found unconstitutional in 
2005117 in a case involving sexual relations between a man and woman. The persistence of 
the Virginia fornication statute (until it was struck down as unconstitutional) suggests that 
the outcast status of nonmarital couples continues. The fact that opposite-sex couples have 
long had the freedom to marry does not seem to have ended the outcast status of those who 
choose not to marry. In fact, one might argue that their outcast status is heightened by the 
increased availability of marriage. 
One might therefore ask: how does one truly go from outcast to the achievement of 
full liberty? If opposite-sex couples are allowed to enter the state-sanctioned regime of 
marriage then it seems logical to allow same-sex couples to have the same opportunity. 
But to accord all partners the opportunity to choose how to create an enduring bond that is 
S. Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws, faSTbaCk SerieS, no. 75. biCenTenniaL SerieS (1976), 
http://eric.ed.gov/?q=ED119389&id=ED119389 [http://perma.cc/W3C4-9Q73]. Further, one can argue that 
the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a public education. But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to invalidate Texas public elementary and secondary schools’ 
reliance on local property taxes to finance schools).
114 Admittedly, they have been viewed as outcasts during the early twentieth century when the legal 
challenges, discussed below, were brought.
115 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (overturning compulsory education law that required 
parents to send children to public school) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning law that 
required instruction only in English) are cited through the opinion. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2600.
116 Id. at 2599, 2603, 2606.
117 See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
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most appropriate for them, without facing an outcast status, then one must think about the 
meaning that is attached to the state-sanctioned relationship. In tipping the scales heavily in 
the favor of state-sanctioned marriage by according huge financial benefits to middle-class 
couples, the state may be contributing to this outcast status. 
3. “[T]he right to marry . . . safeguards children and families 
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, 
procreation, and education.”118
The Court’s articulation of this third principle reflects how the Court’s holding in 
Obergefell may harm some of the people it claims to want to assist, because, again, it 
cannot contemplate that some couples may want to choose to stay unmarried. This third 
principle purports to assist the children born to or adopted by nonmarital couples. The 
Court says: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”119 They suffer 
this stigma even though the Court recognized that there is powerful evidence that “gays 
and lesbians can create loving, supportive families.”120 The Court tries to solve the stigma 
against “illegitimacy” by allowing the unmarried parents to get married. While all couples 
should certainly have the choice to get married, it seems troubling that one factor a couple 
must consider in making this choice is whether their children will be stigmatized because 
of the parents’ nonmarital status. One must wonder if the stigma against nonmarital parents 
and their children121 will increase as a new group is allowed to enter the institution of 
marriage, because couples can no longer offer as an excuse that the state would not permit 
them to marry. 
The Court does not even mention the heightened status of “illegitimate” children under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause when it discusses this stigma.122 The 
only counter-argument it contemplates is the concern that we should not insist that all 
married couples procreate. “In light of precedent protecting the right of a married couple 
not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right to marry 
118 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 The stigma faced by children born in single-parent households is beyond the scope of this Article.
122 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that denying illegitimate children the right to recover 
for the wrongful death of their mother constituted discrimination against them).
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on the capacity or commitment to procreate.”123 In other words, the Court was careful to 
note that the right to procreate also includes the right not to procreate. But it is not careful 
to consider that the freedom to marry should include the freedom not to marry, especially if 
we want to protect the well-being of children born or raised by nonmarital couples.
4. “[M]arriage is a keystone of our social order.”124
The articulation of this principle reflects the revered status that the Court applies to 
marriage. Under this principle, same-sex couples should have the opportunity to receive 
a long list of state-conferred benefits because we have always permitted the state to give 
marriage a privileged status in society. The court then compiles the long list of benefits at 
the state and federal level125 with the glowing conclusion: “The States have contributed to 
the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at the center of 
so many facets of the legal and social order.”126 Because states and the federal government 
have created a privileged status for marital couples, then same-sex couples must be allowed 
to enter that privileged arena. 
The Court lists the material benefits of marriage alongside the more personal or 
spiritual aspects of marriage. It does not distinguish between the two, although the state 
has more impact on the material benefits than the personal or spiritual benefits. After the 
long list of material benefits, the Court says: “Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the 
transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.”127 One 
could argue, however, that the state-sanctioned material benefits of marriage actually 
demean the institution itself by causing people to enter marriage for material benefits 
rather than to express their love for each other. The government, itself, is actually aware 
of this problem. Thus, we have statutes against “marriage fraud” when a United States 
citizen marries a foreign national for the sole purpose of assisting a foreign national gain 
123 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
124 Id. 
125 “These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate 
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision-making authority; 
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; 
campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, 
and visitation rules . . . . Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over a thousand provisions 
of federal law.” Id.
126 Id. at 2601.
127 Id. at 2602.
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United States immigration status.128 Because of the significant material benefits connected 
to marriage, the government can sometimes find itself having to determine if a marriage is 
genuine or purely instrumental. One might say that the government, itself, has demeaned 
the institution of marriage by connecting it to so many material benefits.
Long-term, stable relationships may be the keystone of our social order when the couples 
maintain those relationships out of personal satisfaction and happiness, and when they, 
sometimes, also choose to raise children together as part of that long-term commitment. 
The “social order” created by marriage, however, is not entirely beneficial, especially to 
some women who find themselves confined in traditional roles with few financial resources 
to leave those marriages. A more balanced examination of the meaning of state-sanctioned 
marriage in our society might help the Court to better understand its role in safeguarding 
the freedom to choose to marry.
Thus, the Obergefell decision and its underlying precedents have fodder to develop 
a right to choose to marry. Emphasis on the right to choose marriage could, in turn, help 
develop the first and second aspects of marriage equality: (1) the equal treatment of women 
and men within marriage and (2) the equal treatment of marital and nonmarital couples. 
The next two Parts of this Article will discuss the continued existence of these two kinds 
of inequalities and suggest how a broader reading of Obergefell could help attain these 
aspects of equality.
II. First Aspect of Marriage Equality: The Equal Treatment of Women and Men 
Within Marriage  
A. Coverture: Historical Roots
The first aspect of marriage equality is the equal treatment of women and men within 
marriage through the elimination of the subordination of women to men within marriage. 
As reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s statement from the bench during oral argument, the 
conventional story is that we have largely ended the subordination of women to men within 
marriage by eliminating coverture.129 Coverture is a property-law concept that allowed a 
man to take control of a woman’s property upon marriage. It symbolized the independence 
128 See Identity and Benefit Fraud, U.S. immiGr. & CUSTomS enf’T, https://www.ice.gov/identity-benefit-
fraud [http://perma.cc/9Y4Z-KMHF] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
129 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, 70–71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 
145-56).
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that women lost upon entering the institution of marriage, if they had access to property.130 
Under coverture, children were considered to be their fathers’ assets; women could not 
seek custody of their children upon divorce.131 
Coverture was based on a gendered notion of women’s subservient role to men in the 
household. “Under coverture, when a woman married, she surrendered her legal identity 
which was subsumed into her husband.”132 Coverture was symbolic of a man’s control 
over a woman’s body or “liberty” as well as her property. Nonetheless, the elimination of 
coverture did not cause male domination over women to end. Two historical examples can 
be helpful in understanding the consequences of the elimination of coverture for married 
women. The first story describes a woman who was married under coverture; the second 
story describes a woman who was married shortly after coverture ended.
In 1858, the fifty-three year old Sarah Banks Sherwood married financially-challenged 
Jessup Sherwood.133 When her husband started siphoning off her personal assets, she 
sought to require her husband to post a bond of the value of her estate, so that he could 
not drain all her assets.134 Rather than accede to this demand, he allegedly “knocked her 
130 The qualification “if they had access to property” is important because marriage rates have always 
been lower for poor women than middle-class women. See generally Krissy Clark, Happily Ever After in 
a Cross-Class Marriage, markeTpLaCe (June 22, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/
happily-ever-after-cross-class-marriage [http://perma.cc/67GT-RABS] (connecting marriage to wealth). Under 
slavery, a black woman “was excluded from property ownership because under the law she was herself a form 
of property.” Cheryl I. Harris, Bondage, Freedom & the Constitution: The New Slavery Scholarship and its 
Impact on Law and Legal Historiography, 18 Cardozo L. reV. 309, 316 (1996).
131 See Amber Bailey, Redefining Marriage: How the Institution of Marriage has Changed to Make Room 
for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WiS. J.L. Gender & SoC’y 305, 317 (2012).
132 Christopher Collier, The Campaign for Women’s Property Rights: Sarah Banks’s Story, 54 am. J. LeGaL 
hiST. 378, 384 (2014). As described by Connecticut jurist Zephaniah Swift, in 1850, coverture meant: 
The husband has power and dominion of the wife, as he is responsible for her actions; he 
may control, restrain, and regulate her conduct, and keep her by force within the bounds 
of duty, and under due subordination and subjection. When the wife makes an undue use 
of her liberty, by squandering the estate of her husband, or going into lewd company, the 
husband may lay her under a restraint to preserve his honor and estate--but if he restrain her 
of her liberty unreasonably, or imprison her, she may have relief by habeas corpus.
Id. at 384–85.
133 Id. at 381.
134 Id. at 393.
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down on her bed,” “appeared very angry,” and perpetuated various abuses about which 
she “[did not] wish to say any more.”135 Her legal action was unsuccessful, and she was 
jailed for contempt and ordered to turn over her personal property to her husband.136 Mrs. 
Sherwood’s only legal recourse to avoid this depletion of her financial resources was the 
divorce court. Through the happenstance of intervention from P.T. Barnum, she was able to 
persuade the General Assembly to approve her petition for dissolution of her marriage.137
The publicity from Mrs. Sherwood’s situation may have led to elimination of coverture 
in Connecticut in 1877.138 Thus, when Mrs. Mathewson, in 1906, found herself subject to 
coercive financial practices by her husband in Connecticut, which left her too destitute 
to take care of basic household needs, she was able to sue her husband “to pay her upon 
her demand a certain sum of money”139 for her basic household needs. In a sympathetic 
decision, the Connecticut court explained that women no longer had to lose their legal 
identity or ability to own property upon marriage.140 Thus, in contrast to Mrs. Sherwood, 
Mrs. Mathewson was able to secure funds from Mr. Mathewson during the course of her 
marriage due, in part, to the elimination of coverture. 
But these stories also reflect that the elimination of coverture did not bring equality to 
marriage. A woman, like Mrs. Mathewson, who has to go to court to get basic funds for 
subsistence from her husband is unlikely to be living in a household in which she is being 
treated with dignity and respect on a daily basis. The need for the lawsuit is a reflection 
of the male domination within her marriage and the limited options she had available to 
135 Id. at 396.
136 Collier, The Campaign for Women’s Property Rights, supra note 132, at 413.
137 Id. at 423.
138 Id. at 427.
139 Mathewson v. Mathewson, 63 A. 286, 286 (Conn. 1906). 
140 The court said:
[B]y the law as now generally established, she does not by force of the marriage lose 
her legal identity, nor the capacity of owning property, and does not lose the civil rights 
incident to this capacity. This change in status . . . has been accomplished by a single 
radical act of legislation, directly reversing the former primary and controlling change 
in legal status, affected by force of the marriage, and such radical change more clearly 
involves a consequent change in the civil rights purely incidental to the status.
Id.
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attain the most basic economic security. As we will see in Part II.B, Mrs. Mathewson’s 
situation is, unfortunately, not one that we can assign to the history books as anachronistic 
because married women sometimes continue to find themselves in desperate situations that 
replicate the conditions of domination and subordination within coverture. 
B. Coverture: Modern Vestiges
When the Obergefell Court mentions the abandonment of coverture, it asserts that this 
abandonment “worked deep transformations in [marriage’s] structure, affecting aspects of 
marriage long viewed by many as essential . . . . These new insights have strengthened, 
not weakened, the institution of marriage.”141 While it is true that the elimination of 
coverture was an important step towards women’s gender-based equality, the Obergefell 
Court is stuck in a highly romanticized view of marriage in which both partners to the 
marriage are able to cure their fears of loneliness142 and “hope [for] companionship and 
understanding”143 through this historic institution. This image is in stark contrast to the 
evidence that married women disproportionately bear the burden of caring for others, such 
as children, ill spouses, and elderly parents.144 It is also in stark contrast to the fear of 
rape, battery, and even death, which women must disproportionately fear in any intimate 
relationship, including a marital relationship.145 While the Obergefell decision may spur a 
marriage boom, as same-sex couples enter the institution, it is unlikely to be transformative 
to the women who are still living in a traditional marriage.146
141 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
142 Id. at 2600.
143 Id.
144 Congress heard this evidence in stark detail when it passed the Family and Medical Leave Act. See Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). See also Thomas E. Simmons, Medicaid as Coverture, 
26 haSTinGS Women’S L.J. 275, 279 (2015) (arguing that the ongoing custodial care costs of their spouse is a 
significant threat to financial security for elderly women); Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The 
Work-Family Issue of the 21st Century, 25 berkeLey J. emp. & Lab. L. 351, 353 (2004) (“[E]lder care, similar 
to child care, is heavily gendered, with women disproportionately represented among elder care providers.”).
145 See Conner, supra note 2 (arguing that women’s financial insecurity makes them more susceptible to 
domestic violence and less able to leave abusive relationships). See also Patricia A. Broussard, Black Women’s 
Post-Slavery Silence Syndrome: A Twenty-First Century Remnant of Slavery, Jim Crow, and Systemic Racism—
Who Will Tell Her Stories?, 16 J. Gender raCe & JUST. 373 (2013) (discussing black women’s physical abuse 
by both black and white men and the code of enforced silence).
146 Professor Karst has noted: “As rape and unwanted pregnancy dramatically illustrate, however, coerced 
intimate associations are the most repugnant of all forms of compulsory association.” Karst, supra note 67, 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law412 30.2
It is not clear what the Court means when it says that the elimination of coverture 
“strengthened” the institution of marriage. A smaller percentage of American adults are 
married today than when the United States Census Bureau first started collecting data on 
marriage rates in 1920.147 What is “stronger” about the institution of marriage that has 
caused fewer people to select it? Although it is impossible to prove causation, one might 
argue that women are less likely to pursue marriage than in the past because they, on 
average, have greater economic security as the wage gap between women and men has 
shrunk somewhat.148 Interestingly, the marriage rate peaked in 1960 at 72.2%, shortly 
before the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963 and has shrunk to 50.3% in 2013 as the 
wage gap between men and women has begun to shrink.149 One might therefore argue that 
greater equality for women in society has, in fact, diminished the attractiveness of the 
institution of marriage, in that women now feel less compelled to enter marriage to attain 
greater economic security than in the past. Marriage, itself, however, may not necessarily 
be a more equitable institution for women even if women have gained more equality in 
society at large. Some women may have realized that they can better attain economic 
security, despite the elimination of coverture, without pursuing marriage.150
While coverture has ended as a legal matter, modern vestiges of coverture can be seen 
in the social traditions that endure despite its elimination.151 Women still typically relinquish 
at 638. The freedom to choose to marry must therefore strongly protect the right of an individual to leave a 
marriage, especially when it is abusive.
147 In 1920, 65.0% of American adults were married as compared with 50.3% in 2013. See D’Vera Cohn, 
For First Time, Census Data on Married Couples Includes Same-Sex Couples, peW reS. CTr. (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/18/for-first-time-census-data-on-married-couples-includes-
same-sex-spouses/ [http://perma.cc/7EU8-H8N6]. The 2013 figure, for the first time, includes some married 
same-sex couples.
148 In 1960, women were reported to earn 60.7% of men’s wages; in 2013, women were reported to earn 
78.3% of men’s wages. See The Wage Gap Over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap, naT’L 
Comm. on pay eqUiTy, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html [http://perma.cc/6RQ2-JA3U] (last visited 
June 30, 2015). 
149 See D’Vera Cohn, supra note 147 (marriage data over time); naT’L CommiTTee on pay eqUiTy, supra note 
148 (wage date over time).
150 See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt & Carmen Brun, Protecting Families in a Global Economy, 13 ind. J. GLobaL 
LeGaL STUd. 165, 178 (2006) (“[T]he decline in marriage and birth rates, in part, reflects a general decline in 
the desirability of marriage and having children relative to other options, and a greater economic and physical 
ability, especially on the part of women, to order their personal lives as they see fit.”).
151 See infra Part II.B.
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basic aspects of their human identity like their last name152 and the last names of their 
children153 upon entering the institution of marriage.154 These modern social conventions 
are the vestiges of the historical legal rules under coverture that mandated inequality. 
Although the law of child custody has changed to reflect the “best interest of the child” 
standard,155 the social convention of giving the child the name of the father is a reflection 
of the historical principle that the child is the father’s property. Further, women who are 
married and engaged in paid work outside the home continue to perform an extra three 
weeks of work at home per year as compared to their married male partners after the birth 
of a child.156 “Parenthood remains an important barrier to a complete gender revolution.”157 
The division of labor within the home continues to be gender-based and unequal.
Writing in 2014, Professor Dana Harrington Conner has argued that “economic instab-
ility is a link that binds a woman to her abuser.”158 Women, who are disproportionately killed 
152 The assumptions about women changing their names upon marriage reflect the way the issue is even 
reported. The New York Times recently ran a heading titled Maiden Names, on the Rise Again. See Clair Cane 
Miller & Derek Willis, Maiden Names on the Rise Again, n.y. TimeS, June 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/28/upshot/maiden-names-on-the-rise-again.html [http://perma.cc/FV5W-HX5B]. The article noted 
that “roughly 20 percent of women married in recent years have kept their names.” Of course, it saw no need to 
mention what percent of men married in recent years kept their names, most likely because the statistic would 
be nearly 100 percent. And the article, of course, would never describe the man’s birth name as his “maiden” 
name. We do not even have a word to describe the name a man is given at birth in comparison to the name he 
has after marriage. 
153 See Evonne Lack, Whose Last Name Should You Give Your Baby?, baby CTr., http://www.babycenter.
com/0_whose-last-name-should-you-give-your-baby_10327041.bc [http://perma.cc/ZM7F-M6N9] (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2016) (reporting that an informal survey revealed that four percent of mothers give their own last 
name to their child, when the mother did not take the father’s last name); Molly Caro May, What Happened 
When We Gave Our Daughter My Last Name, hairpin (July 15, 2014), http://thehairpin.com/2014/07/what-
happened-when-we-gave-our-daughter-my-last-name [http://perma.cc/33QM-MZW7] (commenting on 
people’s shocked reactions when a couple gave their child the mother’s last name). See also Melissa Murray, 
What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 am. U. J. Gender SoC. poL’y & L. 387, 388 (2012) (recounting 
the pressure she got to take her husband’s last name when bearing a child but never questioning that she and 
the child would have different surnames).
154 See generally Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family Law, 
85 ind. L.J. 893, 910–12 (2010) (discussing trends in women’s names upon marriage).
155 Id. at 896.
156 Jill E. Yavorsky, Claire M. Kamp Dush & Sarah J. Schoppe-Sullivan, The Production of Inequality: The 
Gender Division of Labor Across the Transition to Parenthood, 77 J. marriaGe & fam. 662 (2015).
157 Id. at 677.
158 Conner, supra note 2, at 340.
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or battered by their husbands,159 have been deprived of the “profound hopes and aspirations” 
within marriage.160 Because marriage depresses women’s labor force participation, it 
makes women more vulnerable to abusive situations that they cannot afford to leave. 161 
“Marriage is the batterer’s gateway to establishing power over the family finances and 
property.”162 Although coverture has formally ended, women’s lack of economic resources 
to live independently from their husband is still a powerful force of inequality in women’s 
lives. Women’s economic precariousness may cause them to be willing to marry men to 
gain access to more financial resources and, once married, make it harder for them to leave 
those marriages, even if they are experiencing conditions of profound inequality. Further, 
as Professor Connor has observed,163 these women’s decisions, which are often socially 
pressured, to leave the paid workforce or accept reduced hours within the paid workforce 
after marriage, often leave them in precarious financial situations. If women had a more 
genuine choice to decide whether to marry, they might be able to avoid some of these 
financial detriments. 
When the Obergefell Court said that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage 
is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy,”164 it lost sight of the fact that women 
do not always have equal access to that individual autonomy within marriage. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,165 in an opinion joined by Justice Kennedy (who also authored 
Obergefell), the Supreme Court recognized that married women sometimes face both 
physical violence and psychological abuse. “Physical violence is only the most visible 
form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of 
women, is also common.”166 Rather than place marriage on a pedestal, the Casey Court 
safeguarded women’s freedom to choose to terminate a pregnancy by overturning the 
159 See Lucinda Marshall, Three Women are Murdered by Their Husbands, Boyfriends Every Day in 
America, aLTerneT (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/story/71309/three_women_are_murdered_by_
their_husbands,_boyfriends_every_day_in_america [http://perma.cc/YJK4-8BE5].
160 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
161 Conner, supra note 2, at 357, 363.
162 Id. at 363.
163 Id. at 357, 363.
164 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
165 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
166 Id. at 891.
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provision that required them to notify their husbands.167 While courts cannot be expected 
to be responsible for the elimination of gender-based inequality within marriage, they can 
seek to ensure that marriage is not placed on a legal and societal pedestal in a way that 
makes it difficult for women to not enter or choose to leave that institution. The Obergefell 
Court’s romantic description of marriage is unnecessarily insensitive to the persistence of 
those gender-based norms and ignores foundational legal precedent that can unmask that 
romanticism.168
 
III. Second Aspect of Marriage Equality: Equal Treatment of Marital and 
Nonmarital Couples 
The second aspect of marriage equality is the equal treatment of marital and nonmarital 
couples. This claim to equality may be especially controversial because existing statutes 
that proscribe “marital discrimination” have often not been interpreted to “forbid[] any 
preference for marital status.”169 As Professor Courtney Joslin has argued, protection 
against marital status discrimination is of the utmost importance because marital status 
discrimination disproportionately affects nonwhite and lower-income households, which 
have a lower rate of marriage than other groups.170
Two pieces of evidence demonstrate the dramatic persistence of this aspect of marriage 
inequality: (1) the adverse treatment of the children of nonmarital couples as compared 
to the children of marital couples, and (2) the adverse financial treatment of nonmarital 
couples as compared to marital couples. The Obergefell Court was made aware of the 
continuing persistence of these forms of inequality but failed to take concrete steps to 
redress them. 
167 Id. at 898.
168 This insensitivity to gender-based norms within traditional marriage may be reflective of a larger 
problem, which is beyond the scope of this Article—that Justice Kennedy often writes or joins opinions that 
reify gender-based norms. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (allowing state to ban some 
late-term abortions on the basis that some women may come to regret their decision despite “no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon”); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a statute making it more difficult 
for child born abroad and out of wedlock to claim United States citizenship if the father rather than the mother 
is the United States citizen because of the inherent and natural mother-child bond that is created at birth).
169 See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 251 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2001). But see Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) (overturning limitation of family health benefits to opposite-sex married partners).
170 Courtney G. Joslin, Marital Status Discrimination 2.0, 95 b.U. L. reV. 805, 806 (2015).
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A. Nonmarital Couples and Their Children
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Levy v. Louisiana171 that it was 
unconstitutional for the state of Louisiana to treat the children of an unmarried woman less 
favorably than the children of a married woman in a wrongful death suit brought by her 
children. “Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong 
allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on 
her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and 
in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent 
would.”172 The remedy for this discriminatory state statute was to allow the “illegitimate” 
children to recover damages. Since Levy, the courts have rendered a number of decisions 
to protect the rights of children born to unmarried parents, and many states have amended 
their laws to strengthen the inheritance rights of the children of unmarried parents.173
Despite Levy and its progeny, children raised by unmarried, same-sex couples have 
often faced a lack of legal protection due to the unmarried status of their parents.174 In many 
states, unmarried couples cannot both be the legally recognized parents of their children, 
when neither is the biological parent,175 thereby depriving those children of valuable legal 
protection. The effect of these rules has been to preclude same-sex couples from jointly 
adopting children when the state forbade same-sex couples from marrying. Two different 
law reform strategies were available to solve this problem: (1) one could seek to change 
the state laws that require two adults to be married to each other in order to become 
the adoptive parents of the children they raise together, or (2) one could seek to change 
the state laws that forbid same-sex couples from marrying each other, so that same-sex 
partners could marry each other and then seek to adopt the children they raise together 
through existing adoption law. The marriage equality movement176 has attempted to solve 
171 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
172 Id. at 72.
173 See Johan Meeusen, Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 43 am. J. 
Comp. L. 119, 135 (1995).
174 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (“[S]ome of marriage’s protections for children and 
families are material.”).
175 See ChiLd WeLfare informaTion GaTeWay, ChiLdren’S bUreaU, Who may adopT, be adopTed, or pLaCe 
a ChiLd for adopTion? 2 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parties.pdf [http://perma.cc/CM4R-
8Q9W].
176 See Murray, supra note 153, at 388–89: 
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this problem of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples by embracing the 
second strategy.177
The problem with the second strategy is that it conflates good parenting with the 
parents being married, thereby contributing to the stigma against nonmarital parents. This 
conflation can be seen in the way the Obergefell Court discusses the issue. The Obergefell 
Court recognizes the harms that flow to the children of unmarried parents—both material 
and attitudinal. The material harm flows, for example, from the inability of the nonparent 
to consent to medical treatment or attend parent-teacher conferences.178 Other harms, 
however, flow from the stigma of illegitimacy. “Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families 
are somehow lesser.”179 By not allowing same-sex couples to marry, the “marriage laws at 
issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”180 
Worried that those sentences have insulted married adults who choose not to have 
children (or are not able to do so), the Obergefell Court then says: “That is not to say the 
Marriage traditionalists argue that marriage was intended to deal with the problem of 
illegitimacy and irresponsible procreation, and, thus, should be restricted to heterosexual 
couples. Those who favor marriage equality argue that illegitimacy is an injury foisted upon 
same-sex couples and their families simply because they are ineligible for civil marriage.
Id.
177 Not all members of the LGBT community embrace this strategy: 
Scholars and same-sex couples critical of the patriarchal and heteronormative foundations 
of the institutions of marriage and family have expressed concerns that LGBT claims for 
access to marriage reify existing structures of inequality rather than challenge them . . . 
[and] suggest [that] attaching parental rights to marriage could be a “significant hindrance” 
to people who choose not to marry or whose relationship configurations do not conform to 
the dyadic norm.
Jason J. Hopkins, Anna Sorenson & Verta Taylor, Same-Sex Couples, Families, and Marriage: Embracing and 
Resisting Heteronormativity, 7 SoC. CompaSS 97, 102 (2013).
178 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“[S]ome of marriage’s protections for children and families are material.”).
179 Id. at 2600.
180 Id. at 2590.
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right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children.”181 But 
notice what the Court does not say. It does not say: “That is not to say that the ability to be a 
good parent is less possible or less likely for those who do not marry.” One might conclude 
that parents who have chosen not to marry will find it all the more difficult to justify their 
decision now that the Court has recognized the “harm” and “humiliation” to the children 
of unmarried parents and suggested that the only way to cure that harm is for the parents 
to marry.
The story of one of the plaintiffs reflects the Obergefell Court’s conflation of marriage 
with good parenting. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse were an unmarried same-sex couple 
residing in Hazel Park, Michigan.182 As single people, DeBoer had adopted one child and 
Rowse had adopted two.183 Under Michigan law, they could not jointly adopt those children 
unless they were married.184 Similarly situated, unmarried opposite-sex adults would have 
faced the same problem—they would not have been allowed to jointly adopt the three 
children. 
In their original complaint, DeBoer and Rowse alleged that the state adoption law 
impermissibly discriminated against unmarried couples. The trial court, however, appeared 
to conclude that their injury really stemmed from their inability to marry rather than the 
inability of all unmarried individuals to jointly adopt.185 The trial court invited the plaintiffs 
to amend their complaint to allege that the state marriage law was unconstitutional, 
thereby precluding them from adopting.186 Their case then proceeded through the courts 
as a freedom-to-marry case rather than as a right-to-adopt case. After the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in their favor, they reportedly said: “Now apparently we have to 
plan a marriage.”187 They did not say: “Now apparently we have to file for an adoption” 
because their right to adopt is still contingent on their willingness to marry. Hopefully, 
181 Id. at 2590.
182 See Deboer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
183 Id. at 760.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 759.
186 Id. at 760.
187 See Ben Freed, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse Celebrate Supreme Court Gay Marriage Decision in 
Ann Arbor, mLiVe (June 26, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/index.ssf/2015/06/
april_deboer_and_jayne_rowse_c.html [http://perma.cc/4NW4-K2K7].
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they genuinely wanted to get married because their right-to-adopt case was transformed 
into a freedom-to-marry case. Michigan law still only allows a second-parent adoption if 
a couple is married. Because the plaintiffs began their lawsuit seeking the right to adopt, 
as an unmarried couple, rather than the freedom to marry, the Obergefell Court could have 
offered some dicta that their right to be legally recognized as parents should not have been 
conditioned on their marital status. That language could have advanced marriage equality. 
An argument in favor of conditioning adoption on marriage is that parents are more 
likely to stay together if they are married. In other countries, however, adults manage 
to stay in long-term relationships to raise children together without formally joining the 
institution of marriage.188 In Sweden, for example, couples typically stay in long-term 
stable relationships and raise children together without being married. “Thus, a child born 
to unmarried Swedish parents who cohabit—as the overwhelming majority of unmarried 
parents in Sweden do—may face less risk of family disruption than a child born to the 
average married couple here in the United States.”189 In other words, couples can choose 
to stay together to raise children on a long-term basis without state-sponsored inducements 
to marry. Despite state-sponsored financial inducements to marry, which will be discussed 
in Part III.B, the United States has the highest divorce rate in the world.190 An exclusive 
emphasis on marriage as a way to get couples to stay together does not seem to have 
worked in the United States; expanding the kinds of couples who receive support when 
they choose to raise children together may be a better state policy to promote our interest in 
the well-being of children irrespective of the marital status of their parents. 
188 Another argument in favor of marriage is that marital couples are more likely to bear children. In 
societies with low fertility rates, policy makers often express concern that low rates of marriage correlate 
with low rates of childbearing. See, e.g., Magali Mazuy et al., Recent Demographic Trends in France: The 
Number of Marriages Continues to Decrease, 68 popULaTion-e 273, 285 (2013); Kwon Tai-Hwan, Trends 
and Implications of Delayed and Non-Marriage in Korea, 3 aSian popULaTion STUd. 223 (2007). Because of 
the inequities of global population distribution, this argument is beyond the scope of this Article. On a global 
level, we continue to have a dramatic increase in population. See World Population Trends, UniTed naTionS 
popULaTion fUnd, http://www.unfpa.org/world-population-trends (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
189 See raLph riChard bankS, iS marriaGe for WhiTe peopLe? 24 (2011). If we want to improve the well 
being of children, it might make sense to consider what state policies facilitate child-birth and the well-being of 
children, such as paid parental leave, good health care benefits, and well-paid work with flexible hours, rather 
than conflate marriage with the well-being of children. See Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 150. The scope of 
policies that would benefit children raised by families is beyond the scope of this Article but it is simplistic to 
only emphasize higher rates of marriage as a way to benefit children. 
190 See The Divorce Rate per 1,000 People, naTionmaSTer, http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/
stats/People/Divorce-rate [http://perma.cc/N78W-36LJ] (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
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B. Financial Benefits from Marriage
Another important aspect of marriage equality is the equal financial treatment of 
marital couples compared with nonmarital couples. The Obergefell decision does not 
further this aspect of marriage equality, 191 even though the Court expressed the view that 
people marry for “expression, intimacy and spirituality”192 rather than financial benefits. 
If the Court really wanted to encourage people to marry out of love, rather than for the 
financial benefits, then it could have suggested that we make the state justify the myriad of 
financial benefits that are accorded exclusively to married couples.
The tax benefits of marriage are especially strong for those couples that reflect a 
traditional marriage by having one high-income and one low-income partner. For example, 
if one partner earns $90,000 and one partner earns $25,000 per year, the married couple 
would have a tax savings of $1,256.50 as compared to what they would have paid 
individually in taxes if not married.193 By contrast, there may be an income-tax marriage 
penalty if they each earn about the same amount of money, and jointly earn more than 
$169,150.194 This aspect of the so-called “marriage penalty” is actually a marriage equality 
penalty for high-income taxpayers.
The benefits of marriage are important when it is time to retire, especially if the couple 
has experienced a traditional marriage. When claiming Social Security benefits, the spouse 
with lower lifetime earnings can claim benefits based on the other spouse’s earnings record. 
If the higher-earning spouse is the first to die, the lower-earning spouse can receive the 
higher-earning spouse’s benefit as a survivor benefit.195 Further, when a surviving spouse 
inherits an IRA, she or he can delay drawing down the account until she or reaches the 
191 Professor Katherine Franke expressed this concern in 2011. See Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a 
Mixed Blessing, n.y. TimeS, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/NGL2-W8FP].
192 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
193 See Tobie Stanger, Getting Engaged? Enjoy the Tax Benefits of Marriage: And You Thought It Was All 
About Love, ConSUmer rep. (Feb. 12, 2015 12:00 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/02/
tax-benefits-of-marriage/index.htm [http://perma.cc/YV7C-SH42].
194 See Jonathan Clements, Getting Married Has Its Financial Benefits, WaLL ST. J., May 25, 2014, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304652804579571931962914924 (paywall access).
195 Id.
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age of seventy and a half.196 If anyone else would inherit the IRA, they would have to 
draw it down based on when the deceased individual reached the age of seventy and a 
half.197 These retirement benefits “can make the difference between running out of money 
in retirement and being financially secure.”198 
Some researchers have tried to price the “cost” of being unmarried in the United States. 
In 2009, Tara Siegel Bernard and Rob Lieber calculated the cost of being an unmarried gay 
couple with respect to various benefits. The health insurance cost ranged from $28,595 
to $211,993; the estate tax expense was estimated to be $43,378; the pension cost was 
estimated to be $32,253; and the spousal IRA cost was estimated to be $112,192.199
The marriage rate among poor couples is closer to that of the marriage rates around 
the world, arguably because poorer couples do not benefit from most of these rules.200 In 
fact, although not frequently discussed, there is a marriage penalty for some poor couples 
in our society. “Getting married might, say, reduce eligibility for Medicaid benefits, the 
earned-income tax credit or the tax credit that can help pay for health insurance under 
the Affordable Care Act.”201 Because middle-class people disproportionately benefit from 
getting married, it is often said that marriage leads to stronger financial circumstances. 
But that is only true if one or both members of the partnership have significant financial 




199 Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The High Price of Being a Gay Couple, n.y. TimeS, Oct. 3, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/your-money/03money.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/GUE4-
WCHX]. Lisa Arnold and Christina Campbell take this research a step further and calculate the “high price 
of being single in America.” Lisa Arnold & Christina Campbell, The High Price of Being Single in America, 
aTLanTiC, Jan. 14, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/01/the-high-price-of-being-single-in-
america/267043/ [http:// perma.cc/RH5P-UAEW]. They calculated the life-time cost as ranging from $484,368 
for a lower-earning woman to $1,022,096 for a higher-earning woman. Id. Their research does not distinguish 
between women who are in a coupled relationship, but considered single as a matter of law, and those women 
who live by themselves. This Article only focuses on individuals who are in nonmarried couples and does not 
ask the larger question of why legal and social policy should favor couples over individuals when according 
benefits.
200 See Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Marriage Gap: The Impact of Economic and Technological 
Change on Marriage Rates, brookinGS (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/jobs/posts/2012/02/03-
jobs-greenstone-looney [http://perma.cc/928V-8XNW].
201 Clements, supra note 194.
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Marriage equality proponents have often supported, rather than sought to undermine, 
this aspect of marriage inequality by encouraging more couples to be able to enter the 
institution of marriage without first asking why those benefits are limited to married couples 
in the first place.202 With the availability of marriage to a larger segment of society, entities 
that currently allow unmarried couples to seek benefits may decide to end those programs,203 
thereby exacerbating marital discrimination. Same-sex couples, who previously could not 
choose to marry but were nonetheless able to obtain domestic partnership benefits, will 
have to decide if they can afford not to marry.204 Opposite-sex couples, who had made a 
conscious choice not to marry, will now have to confront whether they can continue to 
afford that decision. These financial inducements may increase the marriage rate—but for 
what benefit? Although the marriage rate in the United States has been declining, it is still 
among the highest in the western world.205 
202 As Lisa Arnold and Christina Campbell observe: “[L]egalizing gay marriage only solves the problem 
for a few. Many more single people (gay and straight)—more than half of the population—continue to suffer 
from institutionalized singlism, the discrimination of individuals based on marital status.” Arnold & Campbell, 
supra note 199. But see Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 251 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2001) (Lambda Legal Defense 
Fund unsuccessfully arguing that Chicago Board of Education should treat unmarried heterosexual couples as 
well as it treats married heterosexual couples).
203 The State Department is reportedly considering ending domestic partnership benefits. See Josh Hicks, 
Report: State Department Considering Endings its Domestic-Partner Benefits, WaSh. poST, Jan. 15, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/15/report-state-department-considering-end-
to-its-domestic-partner-benefits [http://perma.cc/8UVL-7LKH]. Maryland has ended benefits for employees’ 
domestic partners. See Carol V. Calhoun, Maryland to End Benefits for Employees’ Domestic Partners, emp. 
benefiTS LeGaL reS. SiTe (June 10, 2013), http://benefitsattorney.com/articles/maryland-to-end-benefits-
for-employees-domestic-partners [https://perma.cc/2SWX-XWXG]. For a survey of domestic partnership 
changes, see Joanne Sammer & Stephen Miller, The Future of Domestic Partner Benefits, SoC’y for hUm. reS. 
mGmT. (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/domestic-partner-benefits.
aspx [http://perma.cc/MRC3-MECK]. These sources, discussing the reduction of domestic partner benefits, 
were written before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell. One would expect this trend to be strengthened 
following the Supreme Court’s decision.
204 For some same-sex couples, this “choice” may also be constrained by the lack of statutory protection 
from sexual orientation discrimination under federal or state law. They may “out” themselves by sending out a 
wedding announcement and find themselves subject to overt sexual orientation discrimination by losing their 
job or rental housing. That problem is another way in which the Obergefell decision failed to extend principles 
of equality by being primarily couched in liberty language. That problem is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For discussion of that problem, see Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, 
n.y. TimeS, June 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay-rights-leaders-push-for-federal-civil-
rights-protections.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news [http://perma.cc/V99W-VJM6].
205 See Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, “Countries Compared by People > Marriage Rate. International 
Statistics at NationMaster.com”, UniTed naTionS (Apr. 2001), http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/
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An argument in favor of the state’s favorable treatment of marital couples is that 
people who marry report higher levels of happiness or satisfaction than people who are 
unmarried.206 This argument has many flaws. First, it fails to take into account how marriage 
rates correlate with socio-economic status. Although it is not clear that what we call 
“happiness” increases with socio-economic status, studies indicate that “global evaluations 
of life” do tend to rise as people have access to more economic resources.207 Poor people, 
who are disproportionately less likely to marry,208 report higher levels of “sadness” but it 
is hard to say that that is because they are unmarried or simply because they are poor.209 
Second, this argument fails to consider whether that correlation would continue to 
be true if, due to societal or legal changes, even more people got married and possibly 
rushed into marriage before knowing each other well. Factors associated with a higher 
risk of divorce include marrying at a young age, possessing less education, and having 
less income.210 These factors are interconnected—people who marry at a younger age are 
less likely to have finished their education and less likely to have started to earn a decent 
income than those who get married later in life. To the extent that government incentivizes 
people to marry for economic reasons, it is incentivizing them to marry at a younger age 
before they have the kind of economic stability that is likely to help sustain their marriage. 
stats/People/Marriage-rate [http://perma.cc/EA3U-PZFV]. In 2001, the United States marriage rate was 9.8 
per 1,000 population, as compared to 6.8 (United Kingdom), 5.1 (France), 6.5 (Germany), 5.4 (Italy), 6.4 
(Netherlands), 5.8 (Austria), and 4.7 (Sweden).
206 The Court’s repeated invocation of the wonders of marriage in Obergefell support this view. The Court, 
for example, says that marriage allows couples to “find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
207 See Kostadin Kushlev et al., Higher Income is Associated with Less Daily Sadness But Not More Daily 
Happiness, 6 SoC. pSyChoL. & perSonaLiTy SCi. 483 (2015) (reviewing literature on global evaluations of life, and 
concluding that sadness declines with greater economic resources); Ulf-G Gerdtham & Magnus Johannesson, 
The Relationship Between Happiness, Health and Socio-Economic Factors: Results Based on Swedish Micro 
Data 1 (Stockholm Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 207, Nov. 1997), http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/ 
hastef0207.pdf [http://perma.cc/2JG3-25NK] (finding evidence of greater happiness with more economic 
resources).
208 See Greenstone & Looney, supra note 200.
209 See Kushlev et al., supra note 207.
210 See UTah ST. UniV., hoW Common iS diVorCe and WhaT are The reaSonS? (undated), http://www.
divorce.usu.edu/files/uploads/lesson3.pdf [http://perma.cc/GK48-6SNZ].
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Third, this argument fails to take into account the financial hardship that is 
disproportionately visited upon women who are married and then divorce. To the extent that 
the tax code incentivizes couples to mimic a traditional male/female relationship by having 
the lower-earning individual (typically the woman) stay home from paid work to raise the 
children, it is also makes it harder for a woman to be able to afford to leave an unhappy 
marriage since she has foregone some of her earning power during marriage. A divorced 
woman is likely to suffer financially, in part, because of the decline in her income resulting 
from divorce. This is especially true if she reduced her earnings to facilitate raising children 
during the marriage.211 Whereas marriage tends to depress women’s earning capacity, it has 
the opposite effect on men. On average, married men (who often have children) earn ten 
to fifteen percent more than unmarried men.212 Thus, a woman may not be able to afford 
to leave an unhappy marriage,213 and a man often has strong incentives to stay married to 
maintain his higher earning capacity.
Fourth, reference to the benefits of marriage ignores the data on spousal abuse (usually 
directed at the wife) within marriage.214 “[R]esearch shows that wife assault is more 
common in families where power is concentrated in the hands of the husband or male 
partner and the husband makes most of the decisions regarding family finances and strictly 
controls when and where his wife or female partner goes.”215 Thus, women’s well-being 
directly correlates with equality within the relationship itself. When considering whether 
women benefit from being married, one might want to know if the intimate relationship 
is based on principles of equality. That factor seems to be pre-eminent in determining if a 
relationship leads to greater well-being in a woman’s life, not whether the relationship is 
consummated in “marriage.” 
211 See Lenore J. WeiTzman, The diVorCe reVoLUTion: The UnexpeCTed SoCiaL and eConomiC ConSeqUenCeS 
for Women and ChiLdren in ameriCa (1985).
212 See Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 harV. J.L. & Gender 1, 22 (2005).
213 Women who work fewer hours outside the home are less likely to divorce, possibly because they cannot 
afford to divorce. See Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 150, at 178.
214 See paTriCia TJaden & nanCy ThoenneS, U.S. depT. of JUST, naT’L inST. of JUST., exTenT, naTUre, and 
ConSeqUenCeS of inTimaTe parTner VioLenCe: findinGS from The naTionaL VioLenCe aGainST Women SUrVey 
(July 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf [http://perma.cc/52LH-ZAML] (“[N]early 25 per-
cent of women and 7.6 percent of men report being raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or former 
spouse, cohabiting partner, or dating partner/acquaintance at some time in their lifetime.”).
215 Id. at 33.
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The Obergefell opinion extends the financial benefits of marriage to same-sex couples 
without asking whether those myriad of benefits to marital couples really benefit this 
institution which the Court holds on a pedestal. The Obergefell Court was sensitive to 
the outcast status of gay men and lesbians in our society. 216 In tipping the scales heavily 
in the favor of state-sanctioned marriage by according huge financial benefits to middle-
class couples, the state may be contributing to the outcast status of another group in our 
society—those who do not choose to marry. 
CONCLUSION
In Loving, the Supreme Court recognized that the state may not infringe the freedom 
to choose to marry.217 In that case, Mildred Jeter Loving and Richard Perry Loving were 
able to marry in D.C., but they could not return to Virginia to consummate that marriage 
without facing a prison sentence.218 By exposing them to criminal sanctions, the state clearly 
“infringed” their freedom to marry. The question raised by that case is: “How much action 
is required by the state to constitute an infringement?” Now that same-sex couples can 
marry, what penalties will be imposed upon them (and other couples) if they seek to choose 
not to get married? James Obergefell would not be able to be named as the surviving spouse 
on his partner John Arthur’s death certificate.219 Edie Windsor would face a hefty estate tax 
bill when her partner Thea Spyer died.220 April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse would face the 
possibility of each of their children becoming orphans upon the death of one of them, rather 
than being raised by the other partner.221 Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe 
would face the risk that, if he died in combat, his partner Thomas Kostura would not receive 
state government financial support.222 The Obergefell Court said that criminal sanctions are 
not necessary in order to infringe liberty. “Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it 
does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”223 The Loving decision protected the marital 
 
216 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
217 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
218 See supra Part I.C.
219 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
220 See supra Part I.G.
221 See supra Part III.A.
222 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.
223 Id. at 2600.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law426 30.2
couple from facing criminal sanctions for expressing their love through marriage, but the 
liberty to marry clearly means more than being free from criminal sanctions. 
The Obergefell decision furthers marriage equality and the freedom to marry by 
allowing same-sex couples greater access to the state-sponsored dignity of marriage. State 
and federal governments, however, undermine the freedom to choose to marry by attaching 
so many material benefits to the decision to marry. One hopes that Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer went to Canada to be married out of a desire to express their love and commitment to 
each other—“the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both 
still live there will be someone to care for the other.”224 There is no reason to believe that 
they married in order to help Windsor later escape a hefty estate tax bill.225 We will truly 
have the freedom to marry when people choose marriage out of love rather than as a way 
to attain state-sanctioned material gain.
Although it is difficult to prove that less state pressure to marry will cause people to 
marry more frequently for reasons such as love and commitment, rather than instrumental 
reasons, a recent sociological survey of couples in New Zealand offers some modest hope.226 
Professors Maureen Baker and Vivienne Elizabeth report that, in New Zealand, where 
marriage has lost most of its legal value, couples have found that they can use a wedding 
ceremony to “reflect personal values and lifestyles”227 although, in some instances, they 
choose to maintain some traditionally gendered aspects of the wedding ceremony. State 
neutrality towards marriage has not entirely caused the traditional vestiges of gender norms 
224 Id.
225 See Adam Gabbatt, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer: ‘A Love Affair that Just Kept On and On and On,’ 
GUardian, June 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/26/edith-windsor-thea-spyer-doma 
[http://perma.cc/JJ6J-QC5U].
226 See Maureen Baker & Vivienne Elizabeth, A ‘Brave Thing to Do’ or a Normative Practice? Marriage After 
Long-Term Cohabitation, 50 J. SoC. 393 (2014). Other scholars will, hopefully, do further work on marriage 
policies around the world to see what policies are likely to lead to both marriage equality and the freedom to 
marry. In trying to review this literature, I often found the authors started from the premise that government 
should try to foster as many marriages as possible. That premise often made the sociological analysis of limited 
benefit to my thesis. For example, after providing data on marriage and various social conditions, the authors 
say: “Some financial or non financial benefits should be provided for stimulating marriages, reducing the 
number of divorces and also the female participation on the labor market.” Christina Boboc et al., Quantitative 
Analysis of the Socio-Demographic Impact of Family Benefits, 5Th inT’L ConferenCe on appLied STaTiSTiCS, 
bUChareST (2010) at 6. Yet, the authors make that claim without any critical examination of the benefits of 
marriage to women. Their only concern seems to be an increase in the birthrate.
227 Boboc et al., supra note 226, at 12.
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within marriage to vanish. It has, however, facilitated couples in finding more space to 
express their individual values within marriage. Baker and Elizabeth also report that many 
opposite-sex couples choose to enter civil unions, and not marriages, out of concern for 
the “religious connotations or gendered traditions” of marriage.228 Because marriage has 
no legal value, couples are able to make long-term commitments as part of a civil union 
without legal penalty. The absence of marriage having legal value facilitates the choice to 
marry and fosters individual expression within the institution of marriage.
Now that the Supreme Court has opened up the state-sanctioned institution of marriage 
to same-sex couples, we should ask ourselves how we can best ensure that couples enter that 
institution to attain “the hope of companionship and understanding.”229 Everyone benefits 
when individuals enter the institution of marriage solely as an expression of mutual love 
and long-term commitment rather than out of a desire to attain instrumental gain from the 
government. Individuals will only experience true marriage equality when the freedom to 
marry includes the freedom not to marry. “I don’t” should become as well respected as “I 
do.”
228 Id. at 7. Studies of other countries also suggest that awareness of the likely “gender specialization within 
marriage” causes women in some countries, such as Japan, to choose not to marry at all. See James M. Raymo 
& Hiromi Ono, Coresidence With Parents, Women’s Economic Resources, and the Transition to Marriage in 
Japan, 28 J. fam. iSSUeS 653, 654 (2007).
229 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
